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Abstract 
We argue that a phenomenological approach to social space, as well as its relation to 
embodiment and affectivity, is crucial for understanding how the social world shows 
up as social in the first place—that is, as affording different forms of sharing, 
connection, and relatedness. We explore this idea by considering two cases where social 
space is experientially disrupted: Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We show how 
this altered sense of social space emerges from subtle disruptions of embodiment and 
affectivity characteristic of these conditions. These disruptions are instructive, we 
suggest, in that they highlight the foundational role that body and affect play in 
organizing social space—the lived context in which we first encounter one another as 
social agents.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Social cognition and interpersonal relatedness are currently much-discussed 
topics in philosophy and cognitive science. Many of the debates focus on the causal 
mechanisms purportedly responsible for our ability to relate to and understand one 
another. When emotions and affectivity enter into these debates, they are generally 
portrayed as targets of social cognitive processes (i.e., as perceived in another person’s 
facial expressions, gestures, utterances, behavioral patterns, etc.) that must be 
interpreted or ‘decoded’ by the mechanisms in question. However, the role that 
emotions and affectivity play in facilitating interpersonal relatedness has not received 
the same level of attention. Nor has much thought been given to the spatiality of our 
interpersonal relations—that is, the common space in which we come together and 
engage with one another as social agents. 
In this chapter, we argue that understanding the experiential role of social space, 
as well as its relation to embodiment and affectivity, is crucial for understanding how 
the social world shows up as social in the first place—that is, as affording different 
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forms of sharing, connection, and relatedness. We explore this idea by considering two 
cases where one’s ability to skillfully inhabit social space has been compromised: 
Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. Drawing upon phenomenological approaches 
to the body and spatiality, we argue that this altered sense of social space emerges from 
subtle disruptions of embodiment characteristic of these conditions. These disruptions 
are instructive, we suggest, in that they highlight the foundational role that body and 
affect play in organizing social space—the lived context in which we first encounter 
one another as social agents.  
 
2. Phenomenological approaches to embodiment, affectivity, and space 
 
The Space of Embodiment 
Phenomenology is an investigation of subjectivity. It develops a careful analysis 
of the structures of experience—phenomenal consciousness from the first-person 
perspective—as well as how these structures are shaped by the dynamics of the 
subject’s bodily engagement with the world and others. Importantly, phenomenology 
is not an approach based on introspection or inner mental states. Rather, with its 
emphasis on embodiment and agency, phenomenology focuses on various ways 
subjects inhabit and relate to their world. This embodied and situated approach moves 
phenomenologists to argue that considerations of embodiment from the first-person 
perspective must simultaneously be considerations of space—namely, lived space. As 
Merleau-Ponty tells us, ‘Insofar as I have a body and insofar as I act in the world 
through it, space and time are not for me a mere summation of juxtaposed points…I am 
not in space and in time, nor do I think space and time; rather, I am of space and of 
time; my body fits into them and embraces them’ (2012:141).  
From a phenomenological perspective, lived space is distinct from objective or 
geometrical conceptions of space which see space as static (i.e., the ‘container’ in which 
objects and events are housed) and thus distinct from human contributions (Casey, 
1997). Lived space instead refers to egocentric space experienced from a body-centered 
frame of reference. It has several experiential dimensions, including (to use Merleau-
Ponty’s terminology) both the spatiality of position, i.e., the immediate space of 
perception and action surrounding the subject’s body, as well as the spatiality of 
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situation, i.e., ‘the situation of the body confronted with its tasks’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
2015: 103).  
This latter form of lived space is more structurally complex than the former. It 
is established by the subject’s responsiveness to environmental affordances—
possibilities for action (Gibson, 1979)—that become present in light of the habits, 
skills, expectations, goals, and affects a subject brings to a given situation. In other 
words, the ‘spatiality of situation’ refers to the meaning or significance a situation has 
for the subject when experienced as a unified whole. Crucially, however, these 
situational meanings need not be apprehended explicitly or propositionally. Instead, 
they are disclosed via a tacitly felt practical apprehension of affordances specified by 
the different ways subjects inhabit their environment: in a familiar vs. unfamiliar 
manner, for instance, or when gripped by a certain affective state such as fatigue or 
elation, or when possessing (or lacking) a particular set of habits or skills. For example, 
when looking under the hood at a car engine, a skilled mechanic will immediately 
perceive meanings of that situation (e.g., signs of wear and tear, parts that can be 
tweaked and manipulated, etc.) that elude the novice’s grasp. Similarly, a veteran airline 
pilot will feel at home in the cockpit in a way the non-pilot cannot.  
For phenomenologists, lived space can be actively structured and organized by 
the subject’s environmental manipulations. For example, when I walk into my office 
for the first time after starting a new job, I enter unfamiliar space. I experience the lived 
space of this new environment as diminished or somehow constricted. Since I am 
unfamiliar with the practical configuration of this space and its affordances, it lacks 
‘homeliness’. Of course, I immediately recognize that space as office space and know 
what I’m supposed to do with the things in it. But it’s organized around tools and 
aesthetic qualities—a new desktop computer and keyboard different than what I’m used 
to; empty bookshelves, filing cabinets, and containers waiting to be filled; a stubborn 
window that needs finessing before it will open; pale grey walls or dim lights I find 
vaguely depressing—that are simultaneously both familiar and alien, in that I’ve not 
yet adapted to their idiosyncratic qualities.  
After a few weeks, however, I organize this space according to my needs; I 
come to fully inhabit it by arranging it to my liking and putting my things in it. And I 
now feel this once-constricted space has expanded to afford a range of tacitly 
apprehended possibilities. I know how things work (e.g., the stubborn window, the 
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keyboard with the sticky ‘P’), and I know where to reach when I need something. To 
put the point another way: I’ve actively tailored this portion of my ecological niche 
(Willi, 1999), and thus my spatial experience of that niche, as well as the bodily 
practices I enact within it, are altered to reflect this new mode of skilful inhabitation. 
From a phenomenological perspective, lived space is in this way a dynamic, elastic 
dimension of experience connected with movement, action, and temporal development 
(Fuchs, 2007: 426).  
Important for our concerns is that lived space is also deeply imbued with 
affectivity, which we understand broadly to encompass moods, emotions, and other 
feeling states (Colombetti, 2014). For phenomenologists, ‘affectivity’ does not refer to 
internal states hidden away inside brains and bodies (Colombetti and Krueger, 2015; 
Krueger, 2014). To the contrary, emotions and affects are robustly embodied, 
interactive, and world-directed processes that connect us to a shared world and guide 
our dealings with it.  
This is evident, for instance, in how emotions saturate spaces and situations with 
value and significance. They disclose people and things as inviting, repulsive, scary, 
boring, enthralling, or welcoming; in this way they serve as the vehicle through which 
specific subsets of affordances stand out as experientially salient (or absent, as the case 
may be). This is affectivity’s orienting or appraisal function (Colombetti, 2014: 83-
112). When I walk into a party full of strangers and they glance my way, I immediately 
feel the affective impact of their stiffened postures, quizzical looks, and the stark 
absence of social affordances. I feel increasingly awkward and self-conscious; I cannot 
comfortably settle into this shared space until someone smiles and introduces herself, 
or my host grabs my arm, makes a joke to diffuse my awkwardness, and playfully pulls 
me along to meet and mingle with her guests. Or, if I’m anticipating an important call 
at any moment, the mobile phone on my desk becomes unusually salient: I find it 
difficult to focus on my work as my eyes continually dart to the phone and I double-
check to make sure it’s not muted, that it’s sufficiently charged, has a strong signal, etc.      
Because emotions and affective states in this way involve both appraisal (i.e., 
bodily changes in response to situations) as well as action tendencies (Frijda, 1987) 
(i.e., anticipations of how we will remake the situation, relative to our interests), 
phenomenologists insist that emotions are ongoing subject-world transactions. They 
are both in us and in the world, shaping the contours of lived space; it is through 
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emotions that we continually remain in touch with our environment and respond to its 
possibilities (Johnson, 2007: 66). Slaby and colleagues put the point well when they 
write: 
 
It is adequate to understand emotions as a complex sense of possibility: 
emotions disclose what a situation affords in terms of potential doings, and the 
specific efforts required in these doings, and potential happenings affecting me 
that I have to put up with or otherwise respond to adequately. These two 
aspects—situational (what is afforded by the environment) and agentive (what 
I can or cannot do)—are intimately linked to form a process of dynamic 
situation-access: an active, operative orientation towards the world (Slaby et al., 
2013: 42). 
 
The critical role affect plays in framing experiences the world and of lived space 
receives multiple lines of empirical support. For example, several studies indicate that 
subjects estimate the grade of an incline to be steeper when wearing a heavy backpack 
as opposed to not wearing one, or when they feel fatigued as opposed to feeling 
refreshed (Proffitt et al., 1995, 2001). Even the presence of a supportive friend—
actually present or merely imagined—leads subjects to perceive the incline as less steep 
than when they are alone (Schnall et al., 2008). The psychosocial affective support we 
receive from others modulates how we perceive the world and its affordances. And a 
similar dynamic appears to be at work in the social world. There is evidence from 
cognitive neuroscience, for instance, that shared affect is a crucial component of 
empathy; it allows individuals to pick up on the ways another person is responsive to 
environmental affordances, and in so doing share and understand their perspective on 
the world (Kiverstein, 2015). Without this orienting function of shared affect, 
however—such as in Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD)—individuals struggle to get 
grip on what others find important in a given situation and have difficulty relating to 
them. This absence of affective framing is one of the reasons people with ASD struggle 
to comfortably inhabit the shared spaces of the social world.  
  
Dimensions of embodiment 
With their emphasis on the spatiality of embodiment and affectivity, 
phenomenologists also argue for the need to investigate how various dimensions of 
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embodiment determine the way subjects inhabit and organize lived space. Just as space 
can be experienced (and conceptualized) in both objective and subjective terms, so, too, 
can the body. Clarifying the interplay between the objective and subjective dimensions 
of embodiment—as well as how this interplay relates to the negotiation of lived space—
will help us better understand the spatial disruptions characteristic of Moebius 
Syndrome and schizophrenia.           
Phenomenologists famously distinguish two dimensions of embodiment (e.g., 
(Husserl, 2001; Merleau-Ponty, 2012). On one hand, we can consider the body from an 
internal perspective, i.e., the body-as-subject (Leib). On the other hand, we can also 
consider the body from the perspective of an external observer, i.e., the body-as-object 
(Körper). The interplay of these two dimensions of embodiment constitutes our sense 
of self and worldly relatedness.     
To begin with the body-as-object, my body clearly has a material dimension. It 
is a physical object in the world and shares properties with other physical objects: it is 
a certain size, colour, and shape, for instance, and it takes up geometrical space like 
other objects. Moreover, as a physical object, it causally interacts with other objects in 
the world. And although I live in and through my body from the first-person 
perspective, I can nevertheless relate to it as an object; I can adopt a third-person 
perspective on my body and consider it from the outside while looking in the mirror 
and thinking that I really need to spend more time in the gym, scrutinizing an injury or 
strange rash, or experiencing stage fright while lecturing and suddenly becoming hyper-
aware of how I look to my students. I can also acquire conceptual understanding of my 
body via scientific or medical knowledge, for instance, or adopt an emotional attitude 
toward my body if I’m pleased with my new haircut, say, or self-conscious of a blemish 
(Gallagher, 2005: 25). In these cases, I reflexively objectify my own body; it becomes 
a thematic content of my perception in a way that isn’t normally the case as I move and 
act in the world. 
For phenomenologists, the body-as-subject is meant to characterize the first-
personal intimacy we have with our own body from the inside, the body as 
experientially inhabited. From this perspective, the body is manifest not as an object or 
content of my perception, belief, or attitude, but rather as the transparent vehicle 
through which I act on the world. The body-as-subject—at least when functioning 
optimally—operates as a pre-reflective structure that organizes experience. This simply 
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means that the body is implicitly present as we perceive the world and act on it, 
dynamically shaping in subtle ways both what we experience and how we experience 
it. As Sartre puts the idea, ‘the body is present in every action though invisible…The 
body is lived and not known’ (Sartre, 1956: 427).                
 Consider reaching for a cup. When we reach for a cup, we don’t first have to 
locate different parts of our body and then reflectively think about the various 
movements and postural adjustments needed to carry out our intention in action. We 
simply reach for the cup spontaneously, without thinking. And we can do this because 
of the background work of the body-as-subject. Due to ongoing information from 
proprioceptive and kinaesthetic processes (along with tactile and visual information), 
we have an immediate sense of where are limbs are in space and what sort of actions 
are possible within that space without having to monitor our body or actions. Moreover, 
we experience the cup not merely as a value-neutral object with a number of different 
properties (colour, shape, texture, etc.) but rather as meaningful: as a purpose-built 
artefact affording a range of different interactions (grasping, picking up, throwing, etc.) 
determined by the structure of the cup, the context in which we encounter it, and by our 
experience of bodily subjectivity.   
 The important point is that the first-personal intimacy we enjoy with our body-
as-subject functions as a constraint on our experience of self, space, and world. As 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, the body-as-subject ‘projects a certain “milieu” round itself, 
insofar as its “parts” know each other dynamically and its receptors are arranged in 
such a way as to make the perception of the object possible though their synergy’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 241).           
 
3. Breakdowns in embodiment, affectivity, and social space: Moebius Syndrome 
and schizophrenia as case studies 
With these phenomenological concepts in place, we now consider breakdowns 
in embodiment, affectivity, and social space in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. 
We’re particularly interested in how breakdowns of the former (embodiment and 
affectivity) modulate disruptions of the latter (social space). We argue that paying 
careful attention to the experiential character of these disruptions highlights the central 
role that body and affect plays in determining how we inhabit and negotiate the shared 
spaces of the social world. 
Forthcoming in Phenomenology and Science, eds. Jack Reynolds and Ricky Seybold, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.  
 
 8 
 
Phenomenological disruptions in Moebius Syndrome 
Moebius Syndrome (MS) is a rare form of congenital oculofacial paralysis, 
typically complete and bilateral, resulting from maldevelopment of the sixth and 
seventh cranial nerves. MS affects approximately 0.0002-0.002% of births (Kuklík 
2000). Along with oculofacial paralysis, individuals with MS also exhibit other 
abnormalities: abnormal tongue, hypodontia (i.e., missing teeth due to developmental 
failure), difficulty sucking and eating, limb defects (such as club foot or syndactyly), 
and general problems with motor skills, coordination, and balance (Miller and 
Strömland, 1999). In addition to these physical abnormalities, however, there also 
appear to be subtle phenomenological alterations of embodiment and affectivity that 
resist an exclusively neurophysiological characterization, and which impact the ability 
of people with MS to inhabit and negotiate social space (Krueger and Henriksen, 
2016).    
We can begin by nothing that people with MS often report feeling they don’t 
wholly coincide with or feel at home in their body. This attenuated sense of bodily 
subjectivity—accompanied by a diminishment or flattening of affect—means that the 
body is primarily experienced in a markedly impersonal object-like way.  
For example, James reports: ‘I have a notion which has stayed with me over 
much of my life—that it is possible to live in your head; entirely in your head (…) I 
think there’s a lot of dissociation. But I think I get trapped in my mind or my head’ 
(Cole and Spalding, 2009: 68, 72). Celia describes an even more articulated sense of 
disembodiment which she claims shaped her sense of self from an early age:  
 
I never thought I was a person; I used to think I was a collection of bits. I 
thought I had all these different doctors looking after all the different 
bits…‘Celia’ was not there; that was a name people called the collection of 
bits…Even though I was a collection of bits I always knew there was 
something strong inside that I had a mental dialogue with, but it was not the 
physical body; it was very separate from the physical (Cole and Spalding, 
2009: 42). 
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People with MS often report diminished affectivity they feel is coextensive with their 
diminished embodiment. To be clear about this point: it’s not that people with MS 
lack emotions and feelings entirely. Their reports suggest not an absence of emotion 
but rather a restricted range of emotional sensitivity, responsivity, and expressivity 
impacting both their self-experience and social engagements (Krueger and Michael, 
2012). For instance, James tells us that, ‘I sort of think happy or think sad, not really 
saying or recognizing actually feeling happy or feeling sad’; ‘I’ve often thought of 
myself as a spectator [of his emotions] rather than a participant’ (Cole and Spalding, 
2009: 72). Similarly, Celia claims, ‘I did not express emotion. I am not sure I felt 
emotion, as a defined concept. At my birthday parties I did not get excited. There 
were people around excited, but I followed what they did’ (Cole, 1999: 244). Another 
woman, Eleanor, writes: 
 
[I]f I go back to my late teen years, I was not very embodied as a person and 
the physical nature of attraction was some way away…At this state, I did not 
feel anything [romantic] physically; even though I had matured physically, I 
had no feeling. Like the other feelings it had not kicked in (Cole and Spalding, 
2009: 169-170).    
 
What is relevant for our considerations is that these subtle disruptions of embodiment 
and affectivity appear to significantly alter how the spaces of the social world show 
up for the person with MS. Many of their reports suggest that this diminished 
embodiment and affective flattening constricts their apprehension of social space. The 
social world, if not closed off entirely, is something experienced as alien and largely 
impenetrable.  
Part of this has to do with the fact that, in virtue of their facial paralysis and 
other motor difficulties, people with MS have not developed the repertoire of bodily 
habits specific to the social world that the rest of us have. So, instead of smoothly 
interacting with others—spontaneously coordinating gestures, postures, vocalisations, 
etc.—people with MS assume a hyper-reflexive, excessively objective stance toward 
their body that disrupts the normally transparent interactional dynamics the rest of us 
take for granted (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999). This is a consequence of their 
diminished embodiment and affectivity (i.e., disruptions of the body-as-subject).  
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For instance, Lydia reports that she feels detached from her bodily subjectivity 
and is unable to settle into and inhabit social space; that is, she cannot participate in 
the back-and forth interplay of social interaction without constantly reflecting on her 
gestures, postures and other movements: ‘Instead of facial expression I use my hands 
and shoulders, and my voice, both in its tone and what I say; I construct it all very 
carefully…I have to monitor these things all the time…None of this is automatic’ 
(Cole and Spalding, 2009: 152). Celia describes a similar experience:  
 
All my gestures are voluntary, even now aged 46. Everything I do, I think 
about…All the things I am doing, whether turning my head or moving my 
hands, is self-taught. I learnt from observation…When I was a child, I could 
not gesture, because I was a collection of bits. My body was not me, so 
expression in it, with it, would not be from me, either. It was not a joined-up 
feeling. There was a huge bit missing: with the lack of balance, mobility, and 
problems with coordination, you don’t get a sense of self… (Cole and 
Spalding, 2009: 190).  
 
As a consequence, Celia tells us that, as a child, she was unable to enter into the fluid 
social spaces of collective play that are such an important part of childhood 
development. Due to her excessively objective orientation toward her body (i.e., 
experienced as a collection of relatively disconnected ‘bits’), she felt ‘cut off from 
immersion in action in the body and so cut off from much of what it is to be a child’, 
as Jonathan Cole tells us; Celia eventually came to grasp ‘the gap between herself, 
and her collection of body parts, and her peers’ (Cole and Spalding, 2009: 56). Others 
report this experience of constricted social space continuing into adulthood. Lydia, for 
instance, reports the following experience: 
 
I remember a frightening, startling moment when, at a disco, I saw a girlfriend 
exploring her sexuality and flirting. That was so utterly alien to me…I could 
not find its meaning. I could not work out what it was about. It had no 
relevance to me. My friend was fluttering her eyelids and was enjoying herself 
and you could see the boy and girl doing it. I could not work out why (Cole 
and Spalding, 2009: 168).           
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In sum, what these narratives appear to suggest is that individuals with MS 
often experience a diminished sense of embodiment and affectivity that goes beyond a 
mere description of their specific physiological or facial abnormalities. Their lack of 
bodily self-intimacy flows from a more general overall feeling of being disconnected, 
both from themselves (i.e., as bodily subjects) and others. And this latter sense of 
disconnectedness is apparent in the way that social space is often experienced as 
constricted or impenetrable, as lacking meaning and failing to offer up interactive 
affordances. In some people with MS, disruptions of embodiment and affectivity thus 
appear to modulate the apprehension of social space.  As we’ll now see, similar 
disruptions are also found in schizophrenic experience.  
 
Phenomenological disruptions in schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is a psychiatric illness which involves disintegration of coherent 
thought and affectivity. Symptoms are divided into two main groups: positive and 
negative symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 1994 (henceforth DSM-IV): 
299). Positive symptoms include hallucinations, delusions, loss of contact with reality, 
and grossly disordered thought and behaviour. Negative symptoms, usually occurring 
in the onset of schizophrenia, involve a diminishment or loss of something normally 
present in healthy individuals. Examples include flattened or diminished affect, lack of 
motivation, alogia, anhedonia, neglect of routine self-care, poor memory and 
concentration, difficulty in completing tasks, and social isolation. The negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia adversely impact the quality and structuring of everyday 
life. In what follows, we focus on how interpersonal relations—and the apprehension 
of social space more generally—are affected in schizophrenia.  
Through schizophrenia, an intuitive and taken-for-granted capacity to 
understand and engage with others is lessened and in some cases lost (Sass, 1992a: 23; 
Stanghellini, 2004). Instead, the experience of others is marked by feelings of distance 
and alienation, emerging from difficulties in affectively ‘mak[ing] contact’ with others, 
as one person puts it (Sechehaye, 1970: 46, 54, 55). Changes to intersubjectivity occur 
alongside and are exacerbated by disruptions of embodiment and affectivity (Krueger 
and Henriksen 2016).  
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As with MS, individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders often report 
problems with their embodiment. Many of these reports indicate a diminishment or loss 
of bodily self-intimacy, which is often a consequence of depersonalisation. Instead of 
living transparently through their body as a unified centre of agency and experience—
i.e., the body-as-subject—they describe feeling disconnected or alienated from their 
bodies.   
For example, ‘K’, a 25 year-old patient, says: 
 
I have always had a difficult relation to my body (…) It’s as if there is a distance 
between my body and my mind. It’s like my mind is a little puppeteer, sitting 
far away, controlling my body. It’s not like I see myself from above or 
something. But it’s like I’m not in my body or not attached to it. It’s like my 
body is an appendix that hangs below me. My body feels alien to me (…) I wish 
I could be free of it (Henriksen and Nordgaard, forthcoming). 
 
‘K’ is not reporting an out-of-body experience but rather a persistent sense of not 
feeling perpetually at home in, or present to, her body. Her experience of bodily 
subjectivity is attenuated or somehow diminished.  
These reports are common, although the nature of this diminished embodiment, 
as well as its qualitative intensity, can vary. For example: ‘the body feels awkward as 
if it does not really fit’ (Henriksen and Nordgaard, 2014: 435-441), or ‘I feel strange, I 
am no longer in my body, it is someone else; I sense my body but it is far away, some 
other place. Here are my legs, my hands, I can also feel my head, but cannot find it 
again’ (Parnas ,2003: 227).  
As with MS, this diminished embodiment can also lead some people with 
schizophrenia to experience their bodies in excessively objective terms. The body-as-
subject is no longer felt to move and act as a spontaneous fluidly integrated unity; 
rather, its movement and overall functioning takes on an alien or quasi-mechanical 
character: ‘I’m blessed with a bladder-emptier that I can turn on and off, and an anal 
expeller’ (Angyal, 1936); ‘I walk like a machine; it seems to me that it is not me who 
is walking, talking, or writing with this pencil. When I am walking, I look at my legs 
which are moving forward; I fear to fall by not moving them correctly’ (Parnas, 2003: 
227).  
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 In addition to disruptions of embodiment, schizophrenia also involves changes 
in affect (DSM-IV: 301; Parnas and Sass, 2001; Sass, 1992a, 2004; Stanghellini, 2008). 
Flattening of affect and affective expression are key symptoms of schizophrenia, 
affecting both a capacity to feel emotion, and an ability to recognise the affectivity of 
others (DSM-IV: 30). Affective flattening is often linked to the experience of 
derealisation. Whilst depersonalisation involves a feeling of distance and unreality in 
self-experience (including bodily experience), derealisation involves changes to the 
way in which the world and surroundings are apprehended. Instead of being homely, 
taken for granted, and inviting, the world appears unfamiliar and distant. People 
commonly report that the world feels ‘unreal’ (i.e., dreamlike, stage-like). At the same 
time, people are also encountered as ‘unfamiliar’ and ‘mechanical’ (DSM-IV: 822; 
Hunter, Sierra and David, 2004: 9) These affective alterations have profound 
consequences for intersubjectivity and for self. When felt connectedness to the world 
and an emotional resonance to others is lost, the way in which everyday life is structured 
and lived is radically different, as we shall now explore.  
 
Losing social space 
Given these disruptions of embodiment and affectivity, it’s unsurprising that 
people with schizophrenia often report a severance in feeling connected to others. It’s 
important to note that with a loss of connectedness, we not only lose the capacity to feel 
related to others, but also to feel connected to a shared world—a common social 
space—within which meaning is made (Guignon, 1983: 243). Stanghellini and 
Ballerini describe this breakdown as a ‘loss of primordial intersubjectivity’ (2007:. 
140): an intuitive grasp of others as people who engage in meaningful activities, in 
meaningful situations, and who offer up interactive possibilities for us.  
It is interesting to examine how these changes to intersubjectivity occur 
alongside an experiential fragmentation of lived social space. This fragmentation 
precludes experiencing oneself, others, and objects as contextualised within 
interpersonal space. In particular, a sense of space as shared, social, or even as ‘relevant 
to me’ is undone. Instead, space appears as geometricized and thus loses its quality of 
familiarity, i.e., as space to be inhabited and settled into.  
One person remarks: ‘madness was definitely not a condition of illness; I did 
not believe that I was ill. It was rather a country, opposed to Reality [sic.], where 
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reigned an implacable light, blinding, leaving no place for shadow; an immense space 
without boundary, limitless, flat.’ (Sechehaye, 1970: 44) Here the experience of illness 
involves inherent changes to spatiality; note the parallel between the way in which 
space is described and the symptoms which mark depersonalisation and derealisation. 
Space is ‘flat’, ‘limitless’, and without nuance. Rather than operating as a 
contextualising background for interaction, it instead appears as a neutral container for 
people, landscapes, objects, and self, which likewise are presented as divested of social 
affordances.  
Returning to the previous report, the person continues: 
 
In this stretching emptiness, all is unchangeable, immobile, congealed, 
crystallised. Objects are stage trappings, placed here and there, geometric cubes 
without meaning. People turn weirdly about, they make gestures, movements 
without sense; they are phantoms whirling on an infinite plain, crushed by the 
pitiless electric light. And I—I am lost in it, isolated, cold, stripped, purposeless 
under the light. (Sechehaye, 1970: 44-45)  
 
We see here how depersonalisation and derealisation combine to present a world which 
is experienced as odd, lacking vitality and ‘homeliness’, and is one in which the person 
feels fundamentally isolated. There is a sense in which there is a spatial ‘immobility’ 
marked by a lack of openness or interactive possibilities. 
‘Immobility’ and lack of possibility and change are features mirrored within 
interpersonal interaction in schizophrenia. In interactive situations, there is pronounced 
lessening of the dynamism and spontaneous fluidity of interaction. This is, in part, an 
effect of a growing immobility in bodily expressivity and disruptions of bodily 
subjectivity. We see in the quotation above that others’ gestures are perceived oddly, 
as having no intuitive sense and thus as affording no immediate response. Recent work 
in social cognition stresses the transformative role which gestural attunement, 
appropriate mirroring and synchronisation of bodily expressivity of others plays in 
providing dynamism to interaction (Boker and Rotondo, 2002; Rotondo and Boker, 
2002; Goldin-Meadow, 1999). In the quote above, the person above loses a pre-
reflective awareness of gestures as accompanying and substantively adding to 
communication.   
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The production of gestures in schizophrenia also often loses its fluidity and 
inherent meaning. There is an objective spatialisation of movement instead of the 
production of a smooth, coherent whole; the schizophrenic person perceives gesturing 
not as part of a communicative gestalt but as individualised movements (reminiscent 
of Celia’s experience of her body as a disconnected ‘collection of bits’). They may 
experience difficulty in pre-reflective action and movement as their gaze turns inward 
upon themselves in an excessively self-objectifying way (Stanghellini, 2007: 130). 
Fuchs refers to this as a ‘disembodiment of the self’—a hyper-reflective stance in which 
one adopts an external perspective on one’s body instead of living transparently through 
the body-as-subject’s implicit habits and automatic performances onto the world 
(Fuchs, 2005a: 101; see also Sass 2004; Stanghellini 2007, 2008: 312, 2009). 
The effect of this disruption is that gesturing is hampered or, in severe cases, 
even ceases altogether (i.e., in catatonic forms of schizophrenia). The disruption of 
these interactional dynamics has a profound effect on interaction and feelings of 
relatedness, which are established and sustained by patterns of intercorporeality and the 
mutual negotiation of shared space. As participation in patterns of embodied interaction 
diminishes and loses its fluency, persons with schizophrenia must increasingly rely on 
more ‘deliberative and ideational’ (Sass, 1992a: 23) methods to understand others. 
Stanghellini labels this ‘the attunement crisis’ (2004: 22): 
 
What’s missing is the ability to attune with the current situation, to intuitively 
get a grasp on the thinking of the person you are talking to, and above all their 
emotional plane, and to match it. Obviously, we only realise the existence of 
this emotional medium when it's no longer there. (Stanghellini, 2004: 6) 
 
Instead of approaching others and one’s lived environment in a pre-reflective second-
person and interactional manner, persons with schizophrenia ‘contemplate [their] own 
existence from outside – a third person perspective view, or a view from nowhere’ 
(2004: 22). The person with schizophrenia stands outside interpersonal space and 
perception of space as ‘lived’. In this way, the scaffolding of interaction, usually 
provided through a shared intersubjective space, is unavailable and must be reached 
through other means (e.g., algorithms, tactics). This coincides with feelings of distance, 
alienation, and in the cases above, a sense of desolation. Space becomes stretching, flat, 
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limitless, and infinite in nature and there is an overriding sense of precision in the way 
the space appears as painfully light, smooth, and empty. Again, this experience appears 
to be common in schizophrenia. Another patient remarks: ‘I still saw the room. Space 
seemed to stretch and go on into infinity, completely empty. I felt lost, abandoned to 
the infinities of space, which in spite of my insignificance somehow threatened me’ 
(Jaspers, 1997 [1959]: 81).  
With the loss of an apprehension of space as affording smooth interactions with 
others, there is also a loss of the proper place which things occupy in relation to myself, 
my expectations, and my projects. Sass has already comprehensively described the 
process of ‘unworlding’ in schizophrenia (1992a: 32-33) in which objects no longer 
offer affordances for personal use or meaning. However, in considering spatiality, we 
can go one step further to claim that lived space itself—and not only the things in it—
also undergoes an ‘unworlding’. That is, space and the things and people within it, lose 
social referentiality and coherence.   
In this way, lived space loses its characteristic ‘homeliness’ and becomes 
infinite and detached from human activity and life. The dissociation of space from lived 
space causes a retreat from the world or environment being a meaningful context for 
action and interaction. Without being able to recognise and respond to the social, 
normative, and affective aspects which are inextricably bound with a sense of space as 
social, schizophrenic persons lose a frame of social reference which ordinarily feeds 
into our interactions with others, forming some of the presuppositions which we bring 
to our interpersonal exchanges. 
 
Conclusion 
We have examined various ways in which experiential dimensions of 
embodiment, affectivity and lived space relate to reveal the world as social. 
Examining the disruptions which occur to these elements in Moebius Syndrome and 
schizophrenia highlights the crucial structural role they play in orienting people in a 
world which shows up–first and foremost–as social, and also in shaping ongoing 
patterns of interpersonal interaction. We found similarities in changes to embodiment 
and spatiality in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia, in which experience of the 
body and lived space are marked by hyper-objectivity and a loss of self-intimacy. We 
argued that these alterations negatively impact taken-for-granted and easeful 
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understandings through which situations, spaces, and interactions are encountered as 
socially meaningful.  
To be clear, there also important differences in the experiential disruptions 
characteristic of these conditions, too; we are not suggesting that the underlying 
structural disruptions are identical in both cases. However, taken together, they appear 
to reinforce phenomenological arguments for the foundational role that body and 
affect play in organizing social space. Moreover, this analysis marks out 
considerations of spatiality and embodiment as important candidates for further 
attention in ongoing work on social cognition and interpersonal understanding.  
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